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Did we really once believe that Goldberg v. Kelly' was the opening
volley in a due process "revolution"?2 We may be forgiven the sense of
mild embarrassment that accompanies such memories. Of course, we
know better now. There was no revolution-or at least not the one ex-
pected. The bureaucracy was not radically humanized; the administrative
state was not shaken to its foundations. Bathed in the harsh glare of hind-
sight, Goldberg itself looks very different now. Where once we saw a stir-
ring manifesto for procedural justice, now we see a prefiguring of the
coming retrenchment. In the Court's recognition of welfare recipients'
"statutory entitlement"3 we see the seeds of Roth's' "entitlement trigger." 5
In the Court's sympathetic "weighing" of the recipient's interest against
the government's, 6 we see the germ of Eldridge's7 austere "social-cost
accounting."8
Was there some implacable logic that transformed the generous consti-
tutionalism of Goldberg into the niggardly positivism of Roth and El-
dridge? Were we betrayed by a changing Court or by our own false read-
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University.
t Professor of Law, Boston University.
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ing of its portents? These questions have set the research agenda for a
generation of scholars. Foremost among them has been Professor Jerry
Mashaw, whose prodigious output? has gradually laid bare the deep para-
doxes and contradictions lurking beneath the once-placid 0 countenance of
procedural due process.
Mashaw's long journey has reached a culmination with the publication
of a major book entitled Due Process and the Administrative State."' His
latest opus is not simply, or even primarily, a collection of his previous
writings. Those who have followed his work will see much that is famil-
iar, to be sure. 2 But there is much here that is new, as well. More impor-
tant, Mashaw has integrated these fragments into a panoramic vision of
the role that due process should play in our society. It is a rich, subtle,
and complex vision. But, at bottom, it is deeply and stubbornly ambiva-
lent. Mashaw's pilgrimage through the wilderness of due process yields a
message and a lesson. Due process must save the individual from being
engulfed by the bureaucratic state, reads the message. But the lesson an-
swers: There is no escape from the positivist trap.
I. PROCESS
The procedural metaphor for Due Process and the Administrative
State is conversation. The due process clause, Mashaw says, is an "inter-
pretive placeholder around which or within which to structure our most
general constitutional conversations about the evolution of American gov-
ernment."'18 True to his metaphor, Mashaw has produced a book which is
itself a conversation among the several voices that compete for recognition
within each of us.
9. The principal entries in the list include: Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Digni-
tary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REV. 885 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Dignitary Theory]; Administrative Due
Process as Social-Cost Accounting, 9 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 1423 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Social-Cost
Accounting]; Conflict and Compromise Among Models of Administrative Justice, 1981 DUKE L.J.
181 [hereinafter cited as Conflict and Compromise]; How Much of What Quality? A Comment on
Conscientious Procedural Design, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 823 (1980); The Supreme Court's Due Pro-
cess Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a
Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976); The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theo-
retical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudi-
cation of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974). See also J. MASHAW, BUREAU-
CRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983); J. MASHAW, C.
GOErZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS
AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM (1978).
10. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRuST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 19 (1980).
11. J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985) [hereinafter cited by
page number only].
12. Chapter 3, "The Model of Competence," is taken largely from Mashaw, Social-Cost Account-
ing, supra note 9, and chapters 4 and 5, "Toward a Model of Dignitary Values" and "Dignitary
Process and the Liberal Tradition," are taken from Mashaw, Dignitary Theory, supra note 9.
13. P. 8.
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The structure of the conversation is not dialectical, but iterative.
Mashaw circles in on his subject, laying out his argument in a rough and
encompassing gesture, returning to refine and purify it, returning once
again to enrich and complicate it. He is constantly building structures,
reshaping, demolishing, and resurrecting them, leaving in his wake a trail
of shimmering insights and murky ambiguities.
The introductory chapter sets the tone for the journey to follow. Its very
title-"Was the Revolution a Success?"* 4 -is pregnant with ambiguity.
The "career"15 of the due process clause spans at least three "revolu-
tions," from its origins in the American Revolution, to the Goldberg
revolution, to an "emerging counterrevolution"'" against judicially im-
posed participatory procedures., There is. also a touch of irony in the
phrase, since the secondary meaning of "revolution" is a fitting metaphor
for the circular path of Mashaw's argument, and indeed the historic path
of administrative law itself,' 7 as it cycles through technocratic and demo-
cratic defenses of the administrative state."6
Largely by "historical accident,"' 9 the due process clause has become
the central "interpretive placeholder" for that ongoing attempt at legiti-
mation. Yet, Mashaw argues, two centuries of due process adjudication
have failed to produce an acceptable jurisprudence-in either a "regula-
tive (conflict-resolving)" or "symbolic (value-creating)" sense.20 In an ef-
fort to fill that gap, Mashaw extracts from the history of due process ad-
judication three "themes"-tradition, interest balancing, and natural
rights"-that furnish the inspiration for his models of "appropriateness,"
"competence," and "dignitary values." In the process of elaborating these
models, Mashaw gradually assembles the elements of a complex vision of
an acceptable due process jurisprudence.
The "model of appropriateness" describes the dominant style of judicial
reasoning prior to Goldberg. It is, in essence, the invocation of tradition
with an overlay of judicial self-restraint. Courts canvass customary proce-
dural forms for the one that best matches the social function under scru-
tiny-that is, they search for the "appropriate" analogy. The model's
moral justification is "maintenance of the social order";2" its institutional
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The problem with "appropriateness" reasoning, we are told, is not
methodological but substantive. It is conceptually empty: a process of rea-
soning (by analogy) without reasons (criteria for selecting among compet-
ing analogies). "Appropriateness analysis ...is a blend of the custom-
ary, the contemporary, the just, and the efficacious."23 It is everything, in
short, and nothing-judicial conservatism dressed as tradition, judicial
whimsy dressed as flexibility.
Mashaw takes great pains and many pages to discredit so empty a cari-
cature. As he himself concedes, "Poking holes in the logic of a due process
jurisprudence that judges the appropriateness of governmental forms 'all
things considered' is indeed child's play." '24 Nonetheless, the effort has not
been wasted. By surveying nearly two centuries of due process adjudica-
tion, Mashaw has begun the process of unfolding its many mysteries.
Moreover, while dispelling any lingering doubts about the need for a co-
herent normative theory, Mashaw has planted seeds of doubt about judi-
cial capacity that will ripen into fruit four chapters later.
From the conceptual confusion of "appropriateness" analysis, emerges
the model of "competence." Foreshadowed in the loyalty-security cases of
the 1960's,25 the competence model reached full flower in the explicit in-
strumentalism and interest-balancing of Mathews v. Eldridge.2" In its
flight from doctrinal confusion, the Court blundered into Bentham. Its
vision of due process, much like Bentham's, is "instrumentalist, positivist,
and utilitarian. '27 It is instrumentalist because it views process purely as
a means, having no intrinsic value itself; positivist because the ends to be
served by procedure are set by the positive law; and utilitarian because
any particular procedure's contribution to those ends must be calculated
by balancing private gain against social cost.
Once again, Mashaw's strikingly bland terminology betokens his disap-
proval. The Court's commitment to the "competence" model, we are told,
is "erratic" and "limited," 2 and when it does apply the model, its reason-
ing "sometimes seems to border on the lunatic."2 No wonder, proclaims
Mashaw, since the model is "intellectually overambitious" and "underin-
clusive."30 The rest of chapter 3 is devoted to supporting these claims. In
a long and fascinating passage illustrating how a conscientious judge
23. P. 57.
24. P. 97.
25. See, e.g., Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers' Union v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
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might use the competence model to analyze Goldberg and Eldridge,
Mashaw convincingly demonstrates the model's "enormous appetite for
data that is disputable, unknown, and, sometimes, unknowable."' ,, The
judicial process cannot satisfy that appetite, he concludes, nor can it suc-
cessfully mask its incapacity behind the passive virtues of deference, eva-
sion, or intuition.
But it is not the competence model's "intellectual hubris"32 so much as
its positivism that ultimately seals its fate:
The aversion here is not just to extensive investigation. It is to bal-
ancing interests in the course of a demonstration that general social
welfare demands the suppression of individual claims to procedural
protection.
A claim to due process, like a claim to any other Bill of
Rights protection, is precisely a claim to the protection of minority
interests in the face of majority desires.33
Competence analysis is "underinclusive," in other words, precisely be-
cause it refuses to identify any value that can "trump legislative welfare
judgments.""4 With this dismissal of the competence model, Mashaw has
returned us to our journey's origin once again. We have tramped this
landscape now three times, but never by quite the same path nor with the
same innocence. Mashaw has instilled in us a deeper appreciation for the
practical and theoretical obstacles to social welfare tradeoffs. But in the
process, we have experienced the magnetic and irresistible tug of positiv-
ism that will doom to failure attempts ever to break entirely free of "social
welfare talk."
In chapters 4 and 5, Mashaw begins to develop his answer to the
Court's doctrinal confusion-the theory of "dignitary values." Here at last
he offers us a beacon of hope. Though deeply skeptical of "natural rights
talk,""5 Mashaw is able to tease from our "liberal-democratic" traditions
support for the notion that process has a value to the individual wholly
apart from its capacity to produce correct outcomes. Once again,
Mashaw's approach is iterative. After generating an intuitive list of "dig-
nitary values," he tests his intuition against three branches of classical
liberal philosophy-Lockean, Benthamite, and Kantian. A "rough hierar-
chy" of process values emerges from this exercise. The top tier includes
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vacy-which "have strong claims to implementation via judicial review for
constitutionality."3 6 A second tier consists of various "prudential or deriv-
ative values" such as "individualization, direct participation, accuracy,
and the like," that present only "prima facie constitutional claims for
realization.13 7
After applying his taxonomy to several representative problems,
Mashaw pronounces the dignitary methodology's initial trial run a suc-
cess. But doubts persist. His three fundamental values are not self-
defining. Nor do they seem sufficiently robust to withstand attack from
the encroaching welfare state without reinforcement from some "pruden-
tial" argument that requires courts somehow to balance a set of fuzzily-
specified secondary values.3 8 Implementation of a dignitary theory hardly
seems assured.
As always, Mashaw awaits our emerging skepticism with an answer:
"dignitary appropriateness." This numbing linguistic hybrid is intended
to connote the conjunction of Chapter 2's analogical reasoning with Chap-
ter 5's liberal-democratic theory. The idea is to use liberal theory to con-
struct a small set of prevalidated procedural models which courts can then
use to resolve concrete disputes. Exhibiting his characteristic flair for con-
structing matrices," Mashaw derives four models-negotiation, adjudica-
tion, administration, and majoritarian voting4'-from the cells of a two-
by-two matrix. The horizontal dimension of the matrix distinguishes the
two legitimate bases for exercising power in a liberal state ("consent" and
"impersonal rules"). The vertical dimension distinguishes two "alternative
positive conceptions of democratic social life" ("cooperation" and
"conflict").4 1
After more fully developing these four ideal types, Mashaw uses them
in two ways: first, as a framework for identifying the central tensions in a
wide range of contemporary doctrinal conundrums, and then as a guide-
line for resolving particular due process dilemmas. Yet, as Mashaw closes
in upon his target, taxonomy in hand, earlier misgivings about judicial
overreaching haunt him: "Judicial review identifying deviation from, or
mixing of, ideal types as constitutional error would rapidly be perceived
as a form of constitutional madness."'42 A court armed only with the meth-




39. For other examples, see Mashaw, "Rights" in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE
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"impos[e] on us some unified and simpleminded vision of a complex and
compromised social reality."4 s The formula is still radically incomplete.
The missing ingredient, of course, is proper judicial respect for the
work-product of the political branches. Having so recently denounced the
Court for falling into "positivist traps," Mashaw's renewed courting of
positivism is understandably tentative: "[T]he Court need not wield these
formal categories to second-guess legislative or administrative process
choices. It can seek instead to understand what choice has been made and
to ascertain whether that choice has been implemented in a reasonably
coherent fashion." 44 Thus, for example, where the state has "incoher-
ently" mixed an openended substantive standard (individualized fault)
with an administrative process (summary bureaucratic action), the Court
should "remand[] to the legislature either to take out the fault standard or
to put in an appropriate hearing process. ' The courts' function, in other
words, is not to supplant the legislative choice of decisionmaking structure,
but to ensure its internal consistency with liberal values.
But Mashaw is not content to rest with even this cautious positivism.
Concluding his book with three "cheerful sketches' 4 of contemporary ad-
ministrative law, he gives a ringing affirmation of the extent to which
liberal values have been incorporated into the positive law. In the statu-
tory and common law rules governing participation in administrative
policymaking, protection of welfare state entitlements, and mandatory use
of general rules, Mashaw finds not "disparagement, frustration, or de-
spair," but "creativity, a responsiveness, and a capacity for complex ex-
perimentation.' 47 We have come, it seems, full circle: from the judicial
"hubris" of constitutionalized social welfare accounting to the legislative,
administrative, and even judicial creativity of an aggressive subconstitu-
tional positivism. Despite a century of doctrinal fumbling, the revolution
has perhaps been a success after all.
II. SUBSTANCE
As a "meaningful conversation about the appropriate modes of govern-
mental action,' 41 Due Process and the Administrative State succeeds ad-
mirably. But, just as there is no procedure without substance, there is no
conversation without a message. Mashaw's gyrations are not aimless; they
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commitment to a liberal conception of the constitutional order. An individ-
ualistic construction of the due process clause accords with the libertarian
impulse that he finds embodied in our Bill of Rights, political culture, and
intellectual traditions. It is not as though Mashaw were insensitive to the
allure of fraternalism. "Our fundamental demands are not for separate-
ness, but for community," 49 he concedes. But he would urge us to pursue
those demands "through nonjudicial institutions of private and public or-
dering,"'' 0 not with the blunt and fragile instrument of constitutional
interpretation.
Mashaw's decision to eschew pursuit of fraternal values presents no
difficulties. 5' Far more problematic, however, is his persistent ambivalence
about the proper sources from which to derive his liberal jurisprudence.
As is so often the case, Mashaw is his own best critic. "Which are we to
be," he asks rhetorically at one point, "positive or natural lawyers? And,
if the answer is some prudential combination of both, what could that
mean?""
Which indeed? Mashaw is plainly unwilling to cast his lot entirely
with either school. "General welfare simply will not do as a judicial mea-
sure of constitutional right,"' 53 he declares while urging the Court to repu-
diate Eldridge. Yet, barely seventeen pages later, we find him agreeing
with Bentham that "most natural rights talk is 'nonsense on stilts."' 5 '
Mashaw seeks escape from this dilemma in a kind of contingent, contex-
tualized natural law. The question he says, "is not what rights are natu-
ral to persons, but what rights persons must have to maintain a particular
liberal-democratic polity."155 Thus, the search for process values requires
him to chart a middle course, between the pragmatism of the positive law
and the dogmatism of "rights-talk,"5' 6 to the safe haven of enduring consti-
tutional principle.
Like many such voyages, Mashaw's founders not on the reef of princi-
ple, but on the shoals of application. Stated in abstract terms, his taxon-
49. P. 216.
50. P. 218.
51. As Frank Michelman has argued:
[A] due process entitlement ... cannot convey ... the interpersonal meanings of revelation
and participation, . . . because an official whose explanations and interchanges have been
requisitioned by someone who assertedly owns those elements of his behavior just will not be
engaging in the kinds of acts which carry the interpersonal meanings that (possibly) we yearn
for.





56. See Perry, Taking Neither Rights-Talk nor the "Critique of Rights" Too Seriously, 62 TEx.
L. REv. 1405 (1984).
1536
Vol. 94: 1529, 1985
Due Process and Administrative State
omy of "dignitary values" is undeniably attractive.5" Who, after all, would
seriously contend that equality, rationality, and privacy are not necessary
for the attainment of a liberal-democratic order? "[A]t its core," Mashaw
says of his theory, "it is noncontroversial." 8 Fair enough, but the suspi-
cion grows that he, like Roberto Unger's natural rights theorist,59 has
avoided controversy only at the cost of triviality. Consider, for example,
his analysis of Roth, one of the few decisions of the contemporary Court
whose result he flatly repudiates. He begins by asking whether the Board
of Regents, in refusing to renew Roth's teaching contract, infringed any of
his fundamental dignitary rights. Roth "has no very plausible equality
claim," Mashaw argues, because "[s]o far as we know, everyone on a
term contract gets the same process-some form of evaluation and judg-
ment." 0 Mashaw had earlier defined "equality" in purely formal
terms-as equal weighting of votes in popular elections, coupled with ma-
jority rule.6" In some unexplained manner, the "thin" equality of electoral
participation has ripened into a more robust equality of "process" partici-
pation generally. Perhaps Mashaw has had second thoughts about the
value of formal equality in a world of manifest social and economic ine-
quality. Or perhaps he senses the increasing distance of electoral partici-
pation from the true centers of lawmaking power in the modern adminis-
trative state.
But as quickly as hope for a richer equality claim is kindled in Roth's
breast, it is extinguished. "So far as we know," he was treated equitably.
But how far is that? He was informed that his teaching contract would
not be renewed, period.62 Without more-without an explanation or an
interview or a hearing or something-how can we, or he, ever know what
process was used or whether it bore any resemblance to the process used
in similar cases? How, indeed, can we even know that the universe to
which he should be compared is "everyone on a term contract"? We are
back, it seems, to a purely formal-and empty 63-equality.
No matter, for Roth does have a good rationality claim, we are told.
Since the president of his college gave him no reason for not renewing his
contract, he has no basis for comprehending the action as serving any dis-
57. Indeed, I find his typology a considerable improvement over other comparable efforts, see, e.g.,
Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protec-
tion, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 111 (1978); Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-
Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537 (1983); Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal
Processes-A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1974).
58. P. 220.
59. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLrrcs 241 (1975).
60. P. 209.
61. P. 200.
62. See Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 568 (1972).
63. See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1982).
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cernible public purpose. He has been treated as an object, "a being for
whom reasons are unimportant. '64 Keeping liberalism's promise of gov-
ernmental rationality surely requires the state at least to tell those whom
it injures the reasons for its action.
Yet, as Mashaw recognizes, our society relies on many public institu-
tions that do not, and are not expected to, give reasons for their actions.
He mentions legislative promulgation of statutes, draft lotteries, and jury
verdicts.6 5 He could have added executive pardons, most exercises of
prosecutorial discretion, many grant and contract awards, or even the Su-
preme Court's denial of certiorari. "These are institutions," says
Mashaw, "established to exercise discretion in the absence of, or outside
of, revealed legal criteria. . . . [Tlheir legitimacy lies instead in processes
of selection or operation that support individual liberty and that render
reason giving irrelevant."6 If that is so, either comprehensibility is not a
"fundamental value" or reason giving is not indispensible to making gov-
ernmental action comprehensible.
In any event, we must decide why rationality requires reason giving in
Roth's case, but not in these other contexts. Mashaw's only answer is this:
"Presumably the college president has a reason."' 67 But so, presumably,
does a governor when she denies a pardon, or a jury when it awards a
verdict. Yet death row prisoners and litigants in jury trials are not "enti-
tled" to know what that reason is. Presumably, the distinction lies in the
mysterious "processes of selection or operation" that legitimate those deci-
sions. But Mashaw does not tell us what they are or why they do not
apply with comparable force in Roth's case. Indeed, Mashaw finesses a
perfectly plausible justification for unreasoned action uniquely available to
Roth's president-consent. Roth accepted a teaching contract that was ex-
pressly limited to one academic year and cross-referenced a regulation de-
claring that "no reason for non-retention need be given."6
The attentive reader will hear in this last argument an echo of the Roth
Court's infamous entitlement trigger: Roth has been deprived of no "prop-
erty" interest, because neither the statute, the board's regulations, nor his
contract give him any legitimate expectation of renewal. For a subject that





68. 408 U.S. at 566 n.1, 567 n.4.
69. See, e.g., Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1977); Simon,
Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CALIF. L. Ruv. 146
(1983); Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price
of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. Ruv. 69 (1982); Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," and the
Distinction Between Definition and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEO. L.J. 861 (1982); Van Al-
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ceives surprisingly short shrift from Mashaw. He dismisses it as merely
an expedient, half-heartedly employed by the Court to avoid the pain of
social welfare calculations."0 But surely that will not do. There is, first,
the problem of the constitutional text to be reckoned with: A claim to "due
process" is expressly made contingent on a deprivation of "life, liberty, or
property." It is not at all clear whether or how Mashaw's dignitary values
map onto that constitutional language.
The problem does not disappear, moreover, merely by ignoring the text
of the due process clause. Even "thin" comprehensibility requires some
connection between the governmental action at issue and the person seek-
ing to "comprehend" it. I am as bewildered by the regents' action as was
Roth. Am I entitled to a statement of reasons or hearing? Surely not. My
dignity was not offended by the regents' treatment of Roth. But the only
way to distinguish between Roth's claim and mine is to have some theory
of loss, or disappointment, or deprivation, call it what you will, that iden-
tifies the kinds of interests protected by due process. That theory must
look either to the positive law or to some independent source of inspira-
tion. If Mashaw would reject the former, he must spell out the latter. Yet
his only answer-"substantial state involvement in our lives" 71-merely
rephrases the question.
Even if we overcome these objections, "There is still the question,"
Mashaw says, "of what counts as a reason .... ",72 The answer, appar-
ently, is anything that the president says is a reason-even "I don't like
you." What good is such a "reason," you ask? It enables Roth to chal-
lenge the president's positive-law authority to act on the basis of personal
preference, Mashaw replies. But if the positive law provides a remedy,
constitutional protection is unnecessary. Roth can proceed directly to a
state court to vindicate his statutory right. So long as Roth has a colorable
statutory claim, the state court can compel the president to provide his
reasons for the nonrenewal action.7 1
Furthermore, a simple, unadorned explanation will rarely satisfy a
claimant if he is not also given an opportunity to demand its further elab-
oration or to challenge its premises. 4 The moment we recognize the con-
stitutional legitimacy of such demands, however, we are consigned to the
styne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62




73. The federal courts certainly can and do. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
74. See Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity, and a Kantian Injunction, in XVIII NoMos: DUE
PROCeMs 172, 177-78 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).
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confusion of Mashaw's second tier, where more robust, but amorphous,
values compete in a "prudential" balancing. "Accuracy" enters the picture
here as the versatile handmaiden of both rationality and equality. So do
additional values such as "individualization" and "participation." The
problem is that we do not know how to manage these unruly visitors:
"Prudential systems may balance and accommodate values in an almost
infinite variety of ways."'75
Mashaw seeks refuge in the safety of subconstitutional balancing. Even
if courts are no more adept at interest balancing carried on under the
guise of statutory interpretation, at least their inevitable errors will be
legislatively correctable. That is only a partial escape, however, because
Mashaw is not willing to deconstitutionalize all claims for "thicker" ra-
tionality, as his discussion of Goldberg makes clear.1 Yet, when he tries
to show us how a court might conduct such a constitutionalized balanc-
ing," it looks for all the world like a back-of-the envelope version of the
discredited Eldridge calculus. Mashaw may succeed in expunging El-
dridge's "pseudoscientific" pretenses, but he merely buries its intractable
problems of valuation and prediction under a blanket of "rough
judgment. '78
Mashaw's "translation" of Chapter 5's taxonomy of values into Chap-
ter 6's taxonomy of procedural models alleviates some of these problems,
but only at the expense of creating others. Part of the difficulty lies in the
models' derivation. By some strange alchemy, Mashaw has transformed
equality, comprehensibility, and privacy into "consent" and "impersonal-
ity." He leaves the precise reach of each concept highly uncertain. "Im-
personality" sometimes refers to the rules of decision, sometimes to the
process of decision. "Consent" encompasses both "actual agreement to a
decision"79 and imputed agreement with the results of some hypothetical
"metasocial bargaining."80 The resulting confusion may explain how, on
the very same page, Mashaw is able to characterize adjudication and vot-
ing as both consensual and impersonal.81
My principal objection to Mashaw's four models, however, is not their
derivation or specification, but their use. Which model governs Roth's
case, for example? There are two that seem to fit, and two that do not.
"Bargaining" looks like an attractive candidate because Roth agreed with
the Board of Regents to exchange his labor for a period of one academic
75. P. 204 (emphasis in original).
76. P. 214.




81. Compare pp. 224-25 (carryover paragraph) with p. 225 (Table 1).
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year, renewable solely at the will of the regents, in return for a stated
salary and other benefits. The voting model also seems to apply, since the
regulation leaving renewal to the sole discretion of the regents was
promulgated pursuant to a statute adopted by a popularly elected state
legislature.
Roth's treatment cannot, however, be legitimated as a proper exercise of
either adjudication or administration. If one sees Roth's dispute with the
regents as a conflict of values, he was denied the equality of access to a
neutral decisionmaker required by the adjudicative model. If one sees his
disagreement with the bureaucracy as purely factual, on the other hand,
Roth was denied the protection of precise general rules which is the pre-
condition for administrative legitimacy.
How, then, do we use Mashaw's models to solve Roth's puzzle? Should
the Court choose a model? No, says Mashaw. It should defer to the legis-
lature's choice and merely insist that the choice be "reasonably coherent."
If the legislature intended nonrenewal of teaching contracts to be governed
by adjudicative or administrative procedures, it botched the job. Roth
wins. But if the legislature meant to treat renewals as a matter for bar-
gaining or voting, Roth's claim falls. By selecting a pretested model from
Mashaw's showroom, the legislature has given Roth all the process that is
"due."
Mashaw is quick to point out the objections to his solution. First, it
merely sweeps the constitutional uncertainties under the rug of statutory
interpretation. Since legislatures do not customarily speak in Mashaw-
talk, how are we to know which "choice" they meant to make? Mashaw's
answer is depressingly uninformative: "There is no correct story [interpre-
tation], or there are many. The Court, with the parties' assistance, will
ultimately construct an approved version . . . On the way to that con-
struction, the Court can establish a meaningful conversation about the ap-
propriate modes of governmental action."' 82 The medium ("conversation"),
it would seem, is the message.
Second, we are right back in the clutches of the positivist trap. Yes,
concedes Mashaw, but "this is a positivist trap that holds, the Court in
precisely the right grip. To escape, the judge must assert that there is a
constitutional value beyond legislative will that justifies judicial interven-
tion." 3 But the only examples of such values that he can muster are those
embodied in the prohibition on bills of attainder and the deeply problem-
atic "privacy" interests vindicated in Griswold"' and Wade. 5 Mashaw's
82. P. 244.
83. P. 245.
84. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
85. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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models of legitimate governmental action themselves provide no such val-
ues, precisely because one of those models is "majoritarian voting" and
because his typology contains no criteria for preferring one model to an-
other. "Dignitary appropriateness" is, in the end, subject to precisely the
same criticism that Mashaw leveled at the "competence" model: "[T]here
is no principle here that can be defended against majoritarian desire.""6
III. THE POSITIVIST TRAP
There is a lesson in all this. If Jerry Mashaw, despite the extraordi-
nary subtlety and richness of his mind, cannot exorcise the ghost of posi-
tivism, perhaps it cannot be done. There are, of course, other escapes that
might be tried. The substantive aspect of the due process clause might
become the font for a full set of judicially elaborated entitlements (consti-
tutional "property" and "liberty" interests) that are then protected from
arbitrary alienation by the procedural aspect of the clause.87 But the ut-
terance of two words-Lochner8 and Wade9 -is usually enough to stop
this idea in its tracks.90 Even a much thinner set of substantive entitle-
ments (including, for example, ownership of one's labor or freedom from
bodily restraint) will be hard to confine or even to justify except by a
rather questionable and arbitrary historicism."
A more promising escape route may lie through the territory of "legis-
lative failure." ' 2 Courts should step in to protect those (and only those)
procedural claims systematically undervalued by the political branches. At
one point, Mashaw himself hints at such a theory as a way to justify the
more robust constitutionalism of Goldberg. The theory would premise a
"special doctrine applicable to income support" on the "peculiarly precar-
ious positions" of welfare recipients as a group.93 But it will take more
than "precariousness" to construct a convincing political-failure theory of
procedural due process. To paraphrase Frank Easterbrook, if we trust the
political process, warts and all, to allocate substantive entitlements, why
86. P. 153.
87. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW §§ 15-1 to 15-21 (1978); Tushnet,
The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REV.
261.
88. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
89. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
90. See, e.g., Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradications of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981).
91. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85; Rubin, Due
Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. RE,. 1044 (1984); Williams, Liberty and Prop-
erty: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (1983).
92. See, e.g, Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 10 (1979); Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law,
54 TULANE L. REV. 849, 874 (1980).
93. P. 214.
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do we not also trust it to assign appropriate procedures for their protec-
tion?94 The extent of procedural protection afforded is, after all, just an-
other way of determining the value of the benefit.
A theory of political failure must explain not why legislatures systemat-
ically underprotect certain groups (such as welfare recipients), but why
they undervalue certain kinds of interests (protection against arbitrari-
ness). One possible answer may be that discretion facilitates impermissible
discrimination against a disfavored subgroup (for example, blacks) within
the larger benefited group. Rather than visibly discriminate against the
subgroup (by fiddling with eligibility criteria), the legislature bestows
upon its bureaucratic agents the de facto power to do its dirty work. A
constitutional requirement of procedural regularity (and substantive clar-
ity) may be the price we must pay to discourage such tactics and, thereby,
to honor the commitment made in the equal protection clause.
A different version of the political failure approach might focus on the
role played by an assumed bureaucratic preference for broad discretion.
To the extent that agencies can influence legislative outcomes, they will
skew the resulting legislation in a direction offering less protection against
arbitrary administration than the beneficiary group or the public at large
would prefer.
Taken together, these two theories might suggest that courts should be
especially alert to provide due process protections to the objects of society's
most paternalistic gestures, such as welfare families, the mentally ill, and
prisoners. These groups are never politically strong enough by themselves
to obtain legislative benefits without considerable assistance. One of their
most powerful political allies is usually the bureaucracy that will admini-
ster the program. The price of that support may often be considerable
administrative discretion, rationalized as the latitude necessary for exercise
of "professional" judgment. Likewise, these groups will often contain
many members of subgroups who are the objects of quite ignoble legisla-
tive sentiments. An impulse to nurture mingles, often in the same breast,
with a desire to punish. That combination can easily express itself as a
promise of generous assistance coupled with exposure to individualized
tyranny.
There is a passage late in his essay suggesting that Mashaw glimpsed
the possibility of a special role for due process in the operation of pater-
nalistic programs.95 But, like so many tantalizing insights of his restless
mind, its full development awaits another day. In the meantime we must
apparently be content with the inescapability of the positivist trap. As a
94. Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 110-11.
95. Pp. 249-51.
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constitutional doctrine, procedural due process has perhaps lost its "regu-
lative" bite. It is no longer needed to settle many disputes because ours is
not the procedureless regime of Kafka's Trial; ours is a society "overflow-
ing" with process."' What remains for procedural due process is the
"symbolic" role of "[s]tructuring the constitutional argument in the right
way."'97 No matter that Mashaw's argument does not conclude so much
as merely end. For he has shown us how to carry on the dangling
conversation.
96. Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 117.
97. P. 247.
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